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Excess sensitivity of consumption to
income growth: a model of Loss Aversion*
Giacomo Pasini
The article provides an empirical test on micro-data of a model of individual
behavior based on Loss Aversion: utility is S-shaped, i.e. concave above reference
consumption and convex below it. As a consequence individuals do not reduce
current consumption in response to an expected income decline as long as
uncertainty is high enough. Such a behavior is consistent with excess sensitivity of
consumption to income growth, an empirical regularity which is hard to explain
within a standard Life Cycle model. Loss Aversion is tested on an Italian dataset
(the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Households’ Income and Wealth). The conclusion is
that excess sensitivity could be explained by a model that do not assume
individuals to be expected utility maximizers.
1. Introduction
Intertemporal consumption is one of the main topics in the econometric literature.
Evidence is still quite controversial: as an example, while from a modeling point
of view the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) of Modigliani and
Friedman is generally accepted, this is not consistent with well-known empirical
regularities as the positive and significant sensitivity of consumption growth to
expected income growth. The PIH implies that individual income profile is hump-
shaped, consumption path is flat and they are uncorrelated. Nevertheless data exhibit
a significant correlation between income and consumption series. Such an evidence
is known as “excess sensitivity”. Since Hall (1978), many authors tested several
extensions of the PIH model in order to reconcile theory and evidence. Those
extensions either allow for some characteristic of individual preferences not
considered in the original PIH like prudence, or posit the presence of frictions in
the market as credit constraints. All those models anyhow assume perfect rationality
in the sense of Von Neumann and Morgenstern.
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This is not the only approach to model individual preferences: Devetag
(1999) and Aversi et al. (1999) modeled consumption decisions consistently with
laboratory evidence provided by psychologists and experimental economists. In this
article the possibility that excess sensitivity arises as a consequence of a behavior
known as “Loss Aversion” is considered. While this is not the first attempt to run
such a test on micro-data, the article contributes to the existing empirical literature
explicitly taking into account the role of uncertainty in a Loss Aversion model,
on the ground of the testable implications provided by Bowman et al. (1999) in a
two period setting and extended to a life-cycle framework by Ko´szegi and
Rabin (2006).
Section 2 discusses the implications of Loss Aversion on intertemporal
consumption decisions and compare them to alternative explanations of excess
sensitivity. Section 3 details the computation of income growth variables on the basis
of a set of subjective expectations’ questions. Fourth section is devoted to
the estimation procedure and to the discussion of the results. Conclusions are in
the last section.
2. Loss Aversion in an intertemporal consumption model
Loss Aversion is substantially an instance of reference dependence. People care more
about losses relative to their reference point than about gains, and they exhibit risk-
adverse behavior in the domain of gains, while they are risk-lovers in the domain of
losses. Such a behavior is assumed by the Prospect Theory developed by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Since it is an alternative to
Expected Utility Theory, it is crucial to test it on individual data. In the last decades
many authors found supporting evidence on laboratory experiments and using
financial data, examples are Odean (1998) and Benartzi and Thaler (1995). One of
the first attempts to test it on micro-data was Shea (1995), who found that using
American data evidence is qualitatively consistent with Loss Aversion. Garcia et al.
(1997) still found supporting evidence, but only among individuals that are not
liquidity constrained. Empirical evidence is not all in favor of Loss Aversion: Jappelli
and Pistaferri (2000) used an Italian survey and after controlling for prudence they
found no significant effect of Loss Aversion.
The aim of this section is to set up an encompassing model which can be used to
test simultaneously the standard PIH, prudence, liquidity constraints, and Loss
Aversion. The starting point is the main insight of Hall (1978), which is that under
the PIH consumption follows a martingale, i.e. changes in consumption between
time t and tþ 1 should be uncorrelated with any information in the consumers’
information set at time t. Such a result can be formalized as
 lnCi, tþ1 ¼ b10Xi, tþ1 þ i, tþ1 ð1Þ
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where Xi, tþ1 is a vector of demographic characteristics accounting for differences in
individual preferences.1 If leisure and consumption are not separable, proxies for
labor market conditions in Xi, tþ1 are endogenous, and must be instrumented.
Equation (1) is the empirical counterpart of the Euler equation arising from the first-
order conditions of the intertemporal maximization problem:
E½U 0ðCt ÞjI0 ¼ U 0ðC0Þ, t ¼ 1, . . . ,T ð2Þ
The martingale property of consumption holds as it is stated in (1) only under a
number of important assumptions. Relaxing some of them, a generalized version of
(1) can account for several (and potentially competing) explanations of empirical
regularities, such as the excess sensitivity of consumption to income growth.
The first assumption to be relaxed is somewhat hidden. If the individual utility
function is not linear, so even for a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility,
equation (1) is a first-order approximation of the true Euler equation (2). Using a
second-order Taylor expansion it is clear that second and higher order moments of
 lnCi, tþ1 must be orthogonal to variables in the information set at time t in order
not to appear in the right-hand side of equation (1). Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000)
and Dynan (1993) relax this assumption: they show that if the utility function is at
least three times differentiable, consumption growth depends on its variance:2
 lnCi, tþ1 ¼ Xi, tþ1b1 þ 2Var  lnCi, tþ1
 þ i, tþ1 ð3Þ
2 is then an affine transformation of the coefficient of relative prudence, defined by
Blanchard and Mankiw (1988) as r ¼ CðU 000=U 00Þ. Even if this assumption involves
the order of the Taylor approximation and a third derivative of utility, this is not
simply technical: a prudent consumer takes uncertainty into account when facing the
intertemporal consumption planning problem, while a PIH one does not. A PIH
maximizer facing an expected increasing path of income would rise current
consumption and reduce the future one in order to smooth its life-cycle profile.
A prudent individual instead would do the same only if the expected income is
“sure”, i.e. if there is no uncertainty. Vice versa, a high level of volatility would
induce the prudent consumer to keep current consumption low and save. Therefore,
if income actually increases, future consumption would track it, generating an excess
sensitivity of consumption to income growth. A test for prudence against standard
PIH is then a test of 2 significance.
1Changes in consumption between periods is measured as the difference in natural logarithms:
lnCtþ 1¼ lnCtþ 1lnCt (the i subscript is dropped just for exposition clearness). As it is common
in the consumption literature, this is taken as an approximation of the growth rate of consumption:
lnCtþ1 ’ ðCtþ1  Ct Þ=ðCt Þ. Thus, in the remaining of the article changes in consumption and
consumption growth rate are used as synonyms. The same assumption applies to the growth rate of
income and of other variables used in the analysis.
2The same result can be derived with a exponential utility function and an Autoregressive Moving
Average (ARMA) process generating income (Caballero, 1990).
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The martingale property (1) is obtained assuming that capital markets are
perfect, in the sense that individuals can transfer any desired amount of money
from one period to another. Suppose instead that consumers are perfectly rational,
they maximize their utility as under PIH (with or without prudence), but they
are liquidity constrained, i.e. they cannot borrow against future income forc-
ing current consumption to be below current resources. When agents expect
future income to increase and the constraint is binding, they cannot smooth
consumption: consumption growth is sensitive to income growth. On the other
hand, an expected income decline would induce to reduce current consumption in
order to smooth it: saving in order to transfer resources to future periods is not
affected by liquidity constraints. The empirical implication is that there is an
asymmetry in the sensitivity of consumption changes to predicted income changes:
for a liquidity constrained individual consumption growth is sensitive to an income
increase, but not to an income decline. Equation (3) is therefore augmented:
 lnCi, tþ1 ¼Xi, tþ1b1 þ 2Var  lnCi, tþ1
 
þ 3 ln E½Y þi, tþ1 þ 4 ln E½Y i, tþ1 þ i, tþ1
ð4Þ
where
 ln E½Y þi, tþ1 ¼ IðÞ ln E½Y i, tþ1 ð5Þ
 ln E½Y i, tþ1 ¼ 1 IðÞ
 
 ln E½Y i, tþ1 ð6Þ
 ln E½Y i, tþ1 ¼ ln E½Y i, tþ1  lnYi, t ð7Þ
IðÞ ¼
 ln E½Y i, tþ1 if ln E½Y i, tþ140
0 otherwise

ð8Þ
A test for the presence of liquidity constraints is then H0, LC : 340 and
4 ¼ 0 in (4).
The third assumption to be relaxed, even allowing both for prudence and liquidity
constraints, is that individuals are expected utility maximizers. Loss Aversion allows
for reference dependence and risk loving behavior in the domain of losses. Reference
dependence means that individuals do not enjoy a consumption level per se, but its
distance from a target consumption level. The reference consumption level is usually
thought to be the status quo level, i.e. the consumption schedule individuals are
accustomed to. The second characteristic of Loss Aversion is an asymmetry between
consumption above and below the reference level: individuals are risk averse in the
domain of gains (where a “gain” in this setting is consuming above the reference
level) and risk-seekers in the domain of losses. As an example, take an exponential
function piecewise continuous:
U ðxÞ ¼ 2e
1
2
x þ 2 if x40
5e
1
5
x þ 5 if x  0
(
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where x is the difference between current consumption and the reference level, set
to 0 in this example. U(x) is always increasing, it changes curvature in 0 (i.e. at the
reference point), below the reference point is convex and above is concave and less
steep (Figure 1).
Such an utility function captures a loss-averse behavior: the marginal disutility of
a loss is higher than the marginal utility of a comparable gain. The formal model we
refer to is the one developed by Bowman et al. (1999) in a two-period setting.
A detailed description of its features can be found in the appendix, while this section
focuses on its implication for intertemporal consumption decision. The central result
of Bowman et al. (1999) is that when there is enough uncertainty, people resist
lowering consumption in response to an expected income decline. This result comes
from the risk-seeking behavior in the domain of losses: individuals are willing
to pay in order to give up a certain loss today for an uncertain one tomorrow.
Since with uncertainty there is a chance that future income will not reduce, they
prefer to keep consumption above the reference point today and bear the risk of
suffering a bigger loss tomorrow. Such a result is valid even if there are no chances
of consuming above the reference level in any of the two periods: uncertainty still
leaves a positive probability of suffering a smaller loss tomorrow than the certain
one today. Bowman et al. (1999) model is developed in a two-period setting, but
the result is maintained in a multi-period model if the reference consumption
level does not change along time: if uncertainty is high enough, people tend to
Figure 1 S-shaped utility function.
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postpone losses.3 In terms of empirical implication this means that, given a
sufficiently high uncertainty level, consumers resist to lower immediately consump-
tion in response to an expected income decline.
Retrieving a clear implication about consumers’ response to an expected income
growth is less straightforward. Depending on the individual utility function, an agent
could behave as a PIH maximizer and increase consumption in both periods, or he
could maintain consumption at the reference point in the first period in order to
enjoy a higher gain in the second period. Thus, the marginal effect of an actual
income increase can be either significant or not. Something can be said about the
relative magnitude of an income decline and an income increase effect: Bowman
et al. (1999) assume that the S-shaped utility function is steeper in the domain of
losses than it is in the domain of gains (as it is the function in Figure 1). Therefore,
given such an utility function the marginal effect of a gain is smaller than the
marginal effect of a comparable loss. We can formalize those implications gener-
alizing (4) again:
 lnCi, tþ1 ¼ b10Xi, t þ 2Var  lnCi, tþ1
 
þ 3 ln E½Y þi, tþ1 þ 4 ln E½Y i, tþ1
þ 5  ln E½Y þi, tþ1  Var  lnCi, tþ1
  
þ 6  ln E½Y i, tþ1  Var  lnCi, tþ1
  þ i, tþ1
ð9Þ
It should be remarked that (9) is not the equivalent of Euler equation obtained from
a model accounting for prudence, liquidity constraints, and Loss Aversion. It is an
augment version of the standard Euler equation used to highlight an empirical
relation between consumption and income growth rates, and to test the implications
on such a relation of different economic models. Back to Loss Aversion, the first
implication is that for a high enough uncertainty, the marginal effect of an income
decline is positive. Thus, consumption variance augment the sensitivity of the growth
rate of consumption to predicted income declines:
H0, 1 : 640 ð10Þ
In order to test the other implications marginal effects must be computed:
’ ¼ @ lnC
@E½Y  ¼ 4 þ 6Var  lnCi, tþ1
  ð11Þ
’þ ¼ @ lnC
@E½Y þ ¼ 3 þ 5Var  lnCi, tþ1
  ð12Þ
3See the appendix for the exact set of assumptions needed to extend the model to a multi-period
setting.
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If the null H0, 1 holds, then ’
 is expected to be statistically significant only for high
values of Var  lnCi, tþ1
 
. Moreover, if the utility function is steeper in the domain
of losses rather than in the domain of gains, the marginal effect of a predicted income
decline must be larger than the marginal effect of an income increase:
H0, 2 : ’
4’þ ð13Þ
Bowman et al. (1999) show that in this model an increase in uncertainty can either
increase or decrease consumption. What can be shown is that if expected income is
slightly below the reference level, an increase in uncertainty will increase consump-
tion growth. The explanation is similar to the previous one: an expected income
decline puts the agent in the domain of losses. An increase in uncertainty will rise the
chances that agents will be able to consume above the reference level in both periods,
and therefore they will be more reluctant to reduce current consumption. Again,
maintaining a higher consumption in the first period will lead to a bigger reduction
in the second period if actual income eventually falls. Thus, since individual
reference consumption is typically unknown, it is not possible to retrieve a clear-cut
implication on the variance’s marginal effect.
Table 1 summarizes the implications described in this section referring to
equation (9) parameters. Note that since the interaction terms not involved in (3)
appear in (9), tests for prudence must be rewritten in terms of marginal effects.
3. Specification issues
In order to consistently estimate (11) it is necessary to tackle a number of econo-
metric issues. First, as already stated in the previous section, consumption and labor
market decision are likely not to be separable. If this is the case, working hours and
expected income are almost surely correlated, thus it is necessary to include among
the regressors Xi, t an exogenous proxy for labor supply. Following Jappelli and
Pistaferri (2000) a dummy indicating the lagged working status of the spouse is used.
The second issue is that the disturbance term i, t in (9) is a forecast error, the
difference between realized and expected consumption growth. According to any
model presented before, the time t expectation of the forecast error is zero. This posit
a problem on estimation with short panels: E½i, t  converges towards zero as t goes to
Table 1 Testable implications
PIH Prudence Liquidity constraints Loss Aversion
@ In C
@Var½ In C ¼ 0 @ In C@Var½ In C40 ’þ0 640
’þ¼ ’¼0 ’þ¼ ’¼ 0 ’¼ 0 ’þ5’
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infinity, but this do not guarantee that the cross-sectional average goes to zero even
for large N. In particular, aggregate shocks may induce cross-sectional correlation
between expected consumption growth and income growth that does not go to zero
as N increases. In order to account for unevenly distributed exogenous shocks, the
error term includes a year dummy and its interaction with a set of demographics:
 lnCi, tþ1 ¼ b10Xi, t þ 2Vart  lnCi, tþ1
 
þ 3 ln E½Y þi, tþ1 þ 4 ln E½Y i, tþ1
þ 5  ln E½Y þi, tþ1  Var  lnCi, tþ1
  
þ 6  ln E½Y i, tþ1  Var  lnCi, tþ1
  
þ tþ10hþ ui, tþ1
 
ð14Þ
The time t conditional variance included in (14) is crucial both to test for prudence
and Loss Aversion, but it is often excluded from the estimation since it is not trivial
to find a suitable proxy for it. Consumption variance is clearly correlated with
income variance, but it may well depend on other uncertainty sources: health risk,
interest rates and therefore return on assets’ volatility, inflation risk. The dataset on
which the estimation will be carried on is an Italian survey: given the extensive public
health insurance in Italy, the role of health risk in determining consumption
volatility is likely to be negligible compared with income variance. Returns on assets
and inflation volatility are potentially more relevant. Nevertheless, the error term
structure account for aggregate shocks which are likely to affect any financial return
together with expected consumption and wages. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
income variance is a good proxy for consumption variance. Hence, in what follows,
Vart  lnCi, tþ1
 
is proxied by Vart  lnYi, tþ1
 
where the latter is obtained directly
from subjective expectations.
3.1 Subjective expectations
The usual way to deal with Euler equation is to estimate a regression of consumption
growth on actual income growth. Actual income growth is not exogenous: it involves
time tþ 1 income which is not known to the consumer at time t, and both
consumption and income depend on unobservable individual characteristics.
Therefore if leisure and consumption are not separable they are simultaneously
determined. Thus it is crucial to account for endogeneity, finding a suitable
instrument for actual income growth or a direct measure of expected income.
The dataset at hand come from the Survey on Households’ Income and Wealth
(SHIW) run by the Italian Central Bank. This survey has the advantage of including
subjective expectations about future income. The measure that can be obtained from
these questions is the “perfect” instrument, since by construction it is included in the
consumers’ information set at time t and thus it is not correlated with the error term.
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Observations are taken from the year 1995, 1998, and 2000 waves from SHIW. In
1995 and 1998, the survey included the following questions about expected income:
 pi: What is the probability that in 1 year time you will be employed?
 Y i, t : Given that in 1 year time you will be employed, what is the minimum earning
that you expect?
 Yi, t : And what is the maximum?
 qi: What is the probability you will earn less than ðY þ Y Þ=2?
These questions were asked only to a subsample of individuals among employees,
self employed or unemployed looking for their first employment. Only household
heads are included since the quality of the data for other household members is
generally poor. Therefore, a “valid” observation is a household head with the
following characteristics:
1. interviewed at least in two consecutive waves among 1995, 1998, and 2000;
2. answered to the subjective questions; and
3. did not change status of household head between the two waves.
What is left are 1447 observations, 623 from the 1995/1998 period and the
remaining 824 from 1998/2000.
3.2 Expected income variables
In each year t, income Yi,t refers to the particular subsample at hand. Therefore it is
earnings from labor as defined in the national accounts, i.e. the sum of wages and
earnings from self employment. In contrast to Guiso et al. (2002), unemployment
benefit or pensions are not considered, hence strictly speaking Yi,t is earnings from
labor, not income. Observations with Yi,t equal to 0 were replaced with 1, in order
not to exclude unemployed.
Pooling data from different waves inflation must be taken into account: monetary
measures are all expressed in 1995 thousands of Italian lires by means of the annual
consumption price index provided by ISTAT (the Italian National Statistics Bureau).
Expected income depends on the probability of being employed p:
Yi, t ¼ !i, t with probability pi, t0 with probability 1 pi, t

ð15Þ
where !i are earnings from employment. As in Guiso et al. (2002), ! is assumed to
follow a triangular distribution in order to use all the available subjective information:4
E½Y  ¼ pE½!
where E½! ¼ 1
3
qð2Y þ Y Þ þ ð1 qÞ  ðY þ 2 Y Þ  ð16Þ
4Subscripts are omitted.
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E½! is the expected value of the triangular distribution. The difference
between E½Y ’s logarithmic transformation and current log income is used as an
approximation of income growth between times t and tþ 1. Finally, based on the
sign of such a measure expected income increase  ln E½Y þi, tþ1 and decline
 ln E½Y i, tþ1 are obtained. The same set of subjective questions allows to build an
individual measure of expected income variance:
Var½Y  ¼ pVar½! þ pð1 pÞE½!2
where Var½! ¼ 1
24

qð11Y 2 þ 10Y Y þ 3 Y 2Þ
þ ð1 qÞð3Y 2 þ 10Y y þ 11 Y 2Þ E½!2
ð17Þ
Again, Var½! is the second central moment of a triangular distribution. Via a
logarithmic approximation coherent with what is done for  ln E½Y i, tþ1, income
variance and current income are enough to obtain a measure of the variance of
expected income growth:
Vart ½ ln E½Y i, tþ1 ’
Vart ½Yi, tþ1
Y 2i, t
ð18Þ
This is then used as a measure for the variance of consumption growth,
Var  lnCi, tþ1
 
, given the assumption stated at the end of the previous section.
4. Estimation and results
The first approach is to use those measures to estimate (14) with ordinary least
squares (Appendix Table B1): expected income increase, decline, and variance
computed using subjective expectations are all in the information set at time t, and
thus no endogeneity problem arises. Regardless of the specification, even if the signs
and relative magnitude of income increase and income decline parameters’ estimates
are consistent with Loss Aversion, they are not significant thus supporting the PIH
without prudence. In other words, there is no significant evidence of excess sensitiv-
ity of consumption to income growth. This result is not in line with previous
literature and with well-established empirical evidence: a deeper analysis of the
estimation method is needed.
Poor significance is likely to arise from the choice of income growth measure.
Subjective questions are about income in 1-year time, while the survey is done every
2 or 3 years. Moreover, the expectations do not refer to the first year in the interval
between the survey. SHIW interviews usually start in the first months of the year, and
household are asked about income of the previous calendar year. Therefore, since
subjective expectations refer to a 1-year ahead starting from the moment of the
interview, the relevant time spell depends on the actual date of the interview, which is
not a publicly available information. Table 2 summarizes the time horizon of actual
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income and consumption growth, compared with the one referring to subjective
expectations.
If agents actually plan their consumption with a 2- or 3-year horizon this fact does
not generate any problem, since the 1-year expectation can be considered a good proxy
for a 3-year expectation. By the way such a planning horizon seems too long. It is
reasonable to think that households review their consumption decision every year:
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) found evidence which can be explained by such a planning
horizon for investment decisions. Their argument is that since income taxes are payed
once a year in that period families are forced to think about their earnings and
investments; that is also the moment in which they review their asset allocation.
Given the data at hand, 1-year ahead subjective expectations can be considered
a good measure for expectations over the actual interval between surveys only if
individuals expect their income to grow uniformly. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000)
show that while 1-year expectation is a good predictor of actual income growth over a
longer horizon, the uniform growth assumption is too strong. Thus, as it is standard
in the intertemporal consumption literature, we use actual income growth as a proxy
for expected income growth over the relevant periods. As it was explained in the
previous section, actual income is endogenous since it is built using information
that are not in the information set of individuals at time t. We then estimate (14) with
two-stage least squares, using 1-year ahead expectations as instruments. The same
reasoning should go through for expected income variance: it refers to 1-year ahead
income expectation, and therefore it suffers same problems of 1-year expected
income growth. Unfortunately it cannot be treated in the same way: expected income
growth is used as an instrument for 3-year actual income growth, while it is not
possible to have a measure of the actual individual variance, nor a better measure of
expected 3-year ahead expected variance. Given these data limitations, in the present
article expected income variance is plugged directly in the regression, avoiding the
endogeneity problem of actual measures. The drawback is clearly that a 1-year ahead
expectation is used as a proxy for a 3-year expectation.5
Table 2 Time horizons
Households
interviewed in:
Actual income growth
actual consumption growth
Subjective expectations
1995 and 1998 from Jan 1995 to Dec 1997 from May/Sept 1996 to Apr/Aug 1997
1998 and 2000 from Jan 1998 to Dec 1999 from Feb/Jul 1999 to Jan/June 2000
5Bertola et al. (2005) follow an alternative approach: using the same Italian survey, the authors
proxy actual income variance with the squared actual income growth, and then they treat it as an
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In the first stage, actual income growth is regressed on 1-year expectation and all
the other exogenous regressors. Results are reported in Appendix Table B2. Many
households were interviewed both in 1995 and in 1998, so they appear twice in the
sample. Clearly, those observations cannot be assumed to be uncorrelated: robust
standard errors’ estimation takes into account those variability clusters. First stage
estimates provide a test of the structure of the error term: if there is heterogeneity
on the effect of aggregate shocks, the interactions of group variables with the year
dummies should be significant. As described in Section 3, the error term has the
following structure:
i, tþ1 ¼ l0tþ1hþ ui, tþ1
ltþ1 are interactions between year effect and group dummies, and they capture
unevenly distributed exogenous shocks. They are jointly significant (a joint F-test is
rejected at any confidence level), some are also individually significant, thus support-
ing the assumption that aggregated shocks have different effects on different groups.
Second stage results are reported in Appendix Table B3. Such an estimation is not
straightforward, at least in column (2) and (3): expected income increase, decline,
and their interaction with expected income variance are non-linear transformations
of the first stage predicted value. Being more specific, the predicted value of the first
stage designs either a predicted income increase or decline depending on its sign. The
asymptotic distribution of estimated coefficients is therefore unknown: in order not
to do explicit assumptions on their distribution, standard errors and P-values are
bootstrapped.6
As for the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates, column (1) and (2) of
Appendix Table B3 support the PIH. The third column, which report the estimation
results for the complete regression (14), provides evidence in favor of Loss Aversion:
the parameter of the interaction between expected variance and expected income
decline is positive and significant, thus the null hypothesis H0, 1 : 640, reported in
(10) is accepted.
Appendix Table B4 reports the marginal effects of expected income increase
and decline, the test statistics for H0, 2 : ’
4’þ and its standard error, obtained
taking into account the correlation between ’þ and ’. They are computed at
various percentiles of expected income variance’s distribution: ’þ is never
endogenous regressor to be instrumented with expected income variance. As a robustness check
the same procedure has been applied to the present setting: results differ from the reported
estimates and evidence in favor of Loss Aversion is reduced. It must be noted anyway that the
first stage results highlight a poor explanatory power of expected income and variance:
instruments are exogenous but weak for squared actual income growth.
6While not correct due to the definition of predicted income increase and decline, the usual robust
standard errors for the second stage have been computed. Results, in terms of significance of the key
regressors, are unchanged. Moreover, their magnitude is comparable with bootstrap standard errors.
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statistically significant, while ’ is significant only above the 85th percentile of
variance distribution. H0, 2 is accepted only for high values of variance as well: as
predicted by the model, expected income decline has a positive marginal effect on
consumption growth only with high uncertainty. When such an effect is statistically
relevant, it is significantly larger than the corresponding marginal effect for expected
income increase.
These results, even if already supportive of the Loss Aversion model, are poten-
tially underestimates of the true effect of expected income decline: expected income
variance is extremely low (its median is close to zero) and its marginal effect is never
significant. Such a result may be due to the fact that variance of 1-year ahead
expected income is used as a proxy for 2/3 year ahead variability, which is likely to be
higher. Moreover, a low level of uncertainty about future income is reasonable for
Italy: given the well-known rigidity of the Italian labor market, in particular the
tight bounds to layoffs and the low number of job-to-job movement at older ages,
unemployment risk is likely not to be relevant. Further evidence in this sense comes
from the fact that the instrument for labor market conditions is not significant: if the
instrument is valid this means either that leisure and consumption are separable,
which is in contrast with previous labor economic literature, or simply that there is
almost no unemployment in the sample. Descriptive statistics confirm this second
possible conclusion: out of 1447 observations only 59 are unemployed.
5. Conclusions
This article puts together two strands of literature. On one side, the experimental
economics evidence against Expected Utility Theory in laboratory experiments. The
axioms at the basis of the Von Neumann–Morgenstern theory were tested and
rejected, and alternative behavioral models were proposed. Among them, the
Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) has a prominent role and seems
to fit experimental evidence about the decision process of the individuals. As an
example, it is able to deal with Loss Aversion, the fact that people have different
attitudes towards gains or losses.
On the other side, micro-econometricians proposed different explanations of the
excess sensitivity of consumption growth to expected income. These models allow for
individual heterogeneity and are estimated on survey data. Nevertheless all these
models rely on the basic assumption that agents are expected utility maximizers.
Here, the proposed explanation of excess sensitivity is an estimable version of
Prospect Theory that allows for Loss Aversion. A two-period model is set up and the
testable implications derived. The model is consistent with the data: from a behav-
ioral point of view, this is amongst the first attempts to test carefully Loss Aversion
on micro-data. From an econometric point of view, the model accounts for excess
sensitivity at least as well as other extensions to PIH do.
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Due to the stark differences on the assumptions about individual preferences
between the Life Cycle/PIH and Prospect Theory/Loss Aversion, the natural exten-
sion of what is proposed in this article is to fully understand the intertemporal
implications of Loss Aversion. This not an easy task: relaxing the perfect rationality
assumption has the drawback that obtaining closed form solutions as the Euler
equation turns out to be extremely difficult. Nevertheless the payoff for such an effort
could be quite high: the goal is to describe correctly individual behavior under
uncertainty, a building block of microeconomics.
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Appendix A
Bowman et al. (1999) model and extensions
This appendix reviews Bowman et al. (1999): the authors propose a two-period
consumption model that allows to separate the reference dependence from the gain–
loss utility to the original assumptions of Kahneman and Tversky (1979):
U ðr, cÞ ¼ wðrÞ þ vðc  rÞ ð19Þ
where c is the consumption level, r the reference level of consumption, w(x) is the
reference utility, which captures the utility dependence from the reference point
given the distance of consumption level from it. v(x) is the gain-loss value function.
Assumptions are:
1. vð0Þ ¼ 0;
2. v0ðxÞ40;
3. v0ðyÞ42v0ðxÞ,7 where x40, y50, jxj ¼ jyj, i.e. the marginal value of a loss is at
least twice as big as the marginal value of a comparable gain;
4. v(x) is strictly concave for x40 (risk-aversion) and strictly convex for x50
(risk-love).
7Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found experimentally that the ratio of Loss Aversion—marginal
utility of losses divided by marginal utility of gains—is about 2.5. Bowman et al. prove most of their
results also under alternative (but somewhat less natural) assumptions.
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5. ð@U ðr, cÞÞ=ð@rÞ50 utility is decreasing in the reference level. In other words,
a person derives more satisfaction from a fixed level of consumption the lower
the reference point.
Without loss of generality, Bowman et al. (1999) assume also vðxÞ, wðxÞ to be
continuous, with bounded slope and twice differentiable but for c¼ r. The gain-loss
value function v() is then S-shaped. Writing the consumer optimization problem in
a two-periods world is straightforward:
U ðrt , ct ; r1, c1jI1Þ ¼ wðr1Þ þ vðc1  r1Þ þ E½wðr2Þ þ vðc2  r2ÞjI1
subject to c2 ¼ ðY1  c1Þ þ Y2
r2 ¼ ð1 Þr1 þ c1
ð20Þ
All the uncertainty is in future income, Y2. The second constraint is a hypothesis on
habit formation, where  is the rate at which reference point adjust to recent
consumption. The main result of Bowman et al. (1999), invoked in Section 2 is the
following:
if P
Y1 þ Y2
2
 r1
 	
 2
1þ 
then P
Y1 þ Y2
2
 1
2
r1
 	
¼ 1¼)c1  r1
ð21Þ
With Loss Aversion, if uncertainty is over a threshold determined by the reference
level, agents resist to reduce their current consumption in response to an expected
income decline. This result comes from the risk-seeking behavior in the domain of
losses: with uncertainty there is a chance that future income will not reduce, so that
the agent can maintain a higher standard of living (i.e. a higher reference level). The
lower the parameter , the higher the relevance of the reference point of period 1 and
therefore the incentive to postpone losses. If ¼ 0, the reference point do not change
as a consequence of consumption decision of the individuals, i.e. it is exogenous.
In this case consumers will postpone losses as long as their expected average income
allows to do so, i.e. as long as they respect the intertemporal budget constraint.
Bowman et al. (1999) briefly discuss the intertemporal extension of their model.
Even if the discontinuity at the reference point do not allow for a straightforward
characterization of Loss Aversion implications in such a setting, restricting to ¼ 0
allows to have an intertemporally separable utility function, and thus (21) is still
valid. This is equivalent to assume that the reference point is exogenous or at least
it does not change over time. The uncertainty above which consumers refrain from
lowering current consumption will depend on expectations about future interest
rates and on time preferences, which are not included in a simple two period set up.
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Appendix B
Complete estimation results
Table B1 Ordinary least squares estimation results
(1) (2) (3)
dl998 0.1576 (0.0750)** 0.1559 (0.0751)** 0.1557 (0.0753)**
dl995*edu 0.0011 (0.0038) 0.0012 (0.0038) 0.0009 (0.0039)
dl998*edu 0.0042 (0.0034) 0.0042 (0.0034) 0.0044 (0.0034)
dl995*south 0.0301 (0.0386) 0.0296 (0.0385) 0.0279 (0.0385)
dl998*south 0.0451 (0.0340) 0.0427 (0.0342) 0.0418 (0.0342)
dl995*north 0.0667 (0.0401)* 0.0687 (0.0403)* 0.0658 (0.0403)
dl998*north 0.0805 (0.0328)** 0.0789 (0.0330)** 0.0784 (0.0330)**
dl995*unemp 0.1527 (0.0744)** 0.1197 (0.0774) 0.1090 (0.0764)
dl998*unemp 0.0721 (0.0665) 0.0422 (0.0700) 0.0432 (0.0701)
dl995*self 0.0050 (0.0350) 0.0087 (0.0354) 0.0102 (0.0356)
dl998*self 0.0134 (0.0302) 0.0123 (0.0303) 0.0117 (0.0303)
dlncomp 0.2482 (0.0689)*** 0.2467 (0.0692)*** 0.2454 (0.0694)***
age 0.0022 (0.0011)** 0.0022 (0.0011)** 0.0022 (0.0011)**
lagwwife 0.0011 (0.0190) 0.0008 (0.0191) 0.0023 (0.0191)
diff-married 0.0677 (0.0921) 0.0673 (0.0925) 0.0656 (0.0928)
Var[ln Y] 2.08e-09 (2.61e-09) 3.16e-09 (2.63e-09) 8.93e-08 (7.00e-08)
ln E[Y] 0.0057 (0.0070)
ln E[Y]þ 0.0030 (0.0090) 0.0094 (0.0105)
ln E[Y] 0.0108 (0.0096) 0.0109 (0.0096)
Var[ln Y] *ln E[Y] 0.3376 (0.8105)
Var[ln Y] *ln E[Y]þ 8.76e-09 (7.07e-09)
Notes: OLS estimation of the Euler equation (14). lagwwife is a dummy indicating the lagged
working status of the spouse, age is household head age, dlncomp the log-difference in the
number of family components, diff-married is the difference between married status dummies
at time tþ 1 and t. Year dummies, their interactions with years of education (edu),
macroregions (north, south), unemployment (unemp), and self-employment dummies (self)
account for exogenous shocks. Column (1) includes among the regressors Var[ln C] and
ln E[Y]. In column (2) ln E[Y] is replaced by ln E[Y]þ and ln E[Y]. In Column (3)
interactions among expected income variance and expected income growth and decline are
added. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *Significant at 10%; **significant
at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table B2 2SLS estimation: first stage
dep variable: ln Y
dl998 0.2369 (0.4910)
dl995*edu 0.0447 (0.0255)*
dl998*edu 0.0409 (0.0253)
dl995*south 0.6514 (0.3182)**
dl998*south 0.1344 (0.2454)
dl995*north 0.0671 (0.2718)
dl998*north 0.2056 (0.2251)
dl995*unemp 0.6441 (0.7975)
dl998*unemp 2.4205 (0.6982)***
dl995*self 0.3444 (0.2719)
dl998*self 0.1017 (0.1981)
dlncomp 0.3020 (0.6600)
age 0.0638 (0.0109)***
lagwwife 0.2754 (0.1484)*
diff-married 0.1197 (0.4396)
Var [ ln Y] 1.47e-08 (3.05e-08)
ln E[Y] 0.3934 (0.0673)***
Notes: First stage regression on the 2SLS estimation. Demographics
and controls for exogenous shocks are the same as in Table B1.
 ln E[Y] is the excluded instrument. Robust standard errors are
presented in parenthesis. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
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Table B3 2SLS estimation: second stage
(1) (2) (3)
dl998 0.1611 (0.0758)** 0.1611 (0.0734)** 0.1681 (0.0727)**
dl995*edu 0.0005 (0.0039) 0.0005 (0.0038) 0.0009 (0.0038)
dl998*edu 0.0048 (0.0035) 0.0048 (0.0034) 0.0051 (0.0035)
dl995*south 0.0205 (0.0428) 0.0200 (0.0433) 0.0088 (0.0431)
dl998*south 0.0470 (0.0349) 0.0467 (0.0334) 0.0446 (0.0337)
dl995*north 0.0677 (0.0407)* 0.0678 (0.0408)* 0.0602 (0.0403)
dl998*north 0.0835 (0.0335)** 0.0834 (0.0333)** 0.0816 (0.0333)**
dl995*unemp 0.1621 (0.0795)** 0.1605 (0.0764)** 0.1942 (0.0842)**
dl998*unemp 0.1074 (0.0995) 0.1018 (0.1108) 0.1069 (0.1123)
dl995*self 0.00007 (0.0363) 0.00009 (0.0354) 0.0001 (0.0354)
dl998*self 0.0149 (0.0310) 0.0148 (0.0300) 0.0138 (0.0300)
dlncomp 0.2526 (0.0701)*** 0.2526 (0.0675)*** 0.2574 (0.0673)***
age 0.0031 (0.0017)* 0.0031 (0.0017)* 0.0035 (0.0017)**
lagwwife 0.0051 (0.0201) 0.0053 (0.0190) 0.0095 (0.0189)
diff-married 0.0695 (0.0921) 0.0696 (0.0927) 0.0638 (0.0922)
Var[ln Y] 1.87e-09 (2.81e-09) 2.01e-09 (3.68e-09) 1.49e-08 (1.61e-08)
ln E[Y] 0.0146 (0.0181)
ln E[Y]þ 0.0125 (0.0237) 0.0182 (0.0238)
ln E[Y] 0.0160 (0.0207) 0.0150 (0.0208)
Var[ln Y] *ln E[Y] 0.2954 (0.1438)**
Var[ln Y] *ln E[Y]þ 2.54e-09 (3.29e-09)
Notes: 2SLS estimation of the Euler equation (14). Demographics and controls for exogenous
shocks are the same as in Tables B1 and B2. Column (1) includes among the regressors
Var[ ln C] and  ln E[Y]. In column (2)  ln E[Y] is replaced by  ln E[Y]þ and  ln E[Y].
In Column (3) interactions among expected income variance and expected income growth
and decline are added. Actual income growth is instrumented with expected income growth.
First stage regression is reported in Table B2. Predicted income decline and increase in
columns (2) and (3) are obtained as explained in Section 4. Bootstrapped standard errors
(1000 replications) are presented in parenthesis. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
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Table B4 Marginal effects for expected income
Var ( In Ytþ 1)
percentile
’þ ’ t-stat for H0,2:
H0: ’
 ’þ¼0 versus
H1: ’
 ’þ40
5 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.015 (0.0208) 1.0507
10 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.015 (0.0208) 1.0507
15 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.015 (0.0208) 1.0509
20 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.015 (0.0208) 1.0512
25 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.015 (0.0208) 1.0519
30 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.015 (0.0208) 1.0529
35 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.0151 (0.0208) 1.0541
40 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.0151 (0.0208) 1.0565
45 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.0152 (0.0208) 1.0598
50 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.0154 (0.0208) 1.0635
55 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.0156 (0.0208) 1.0721
60 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.0163 (0.0208) 1.0920
65 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.0178 (0.0209) 1.1391
70 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.0235 (0.0214) 1.3061*
75 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.0328 (0.0228) 1.5494*
80 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.0378 (0.0239) 1.6607**
85 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.042 (0.025)* 1.7452**
90 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.05 (0.0274)* 1.8819**
95 0.0182 (0.0238) 0.0977 (0.046)** 2.2393**
Notes: Each line report the marginal effect of expected income increase ’þ, the marginal effect
of expected income decline ’þ, t-statistic for test H0,2: ’
þ5’ for a given percentile of
expected income variance. ’þ is almost constant across the whole distribution: difference
across percentile are not larger than 108 and therefore are not highlighted in the table.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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